

Message Text

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----080810 111801Z /42

O P 111743Z SEP 78
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9882
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY

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EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR, TU, US, CY, MASS, MARR
SUBJECT: US-TURKEY DISCUSSIONS, MUNICH, SEPT. 8

SUMMARY: AT TURKISH INITIATIVE COUNSELOR NIMETZ MET WITH
MFA SECRETARY GENERAL ELEKDAG FOR TWO AND A HALF HOURS
SATURDAY AFTERNOON SEPTEMBER 8 AT TURKISH CONSULATE
GENERAL MUNICH. AMBASSADOR ELEKDAG WAS ACCOMPANIED BY
MFA OFFICIALS YALIM ERALP AND ALI TUYGAN; OTHER US
PARTICIPANTS WERE EUR/SE DIRECTOR EUING, SPECIAL
ASSISTANT TO COUNSELOR HOPPER, AND ANKARA DCM DILLON.

2. ELEKDAG SAID THAT ON BASIS OF HIGH LEVEL DECISION,
PM ECEVIT HAD DECIDED TO ANNOUNCE REACTIVATION OF US
DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS IN TURKEY IMMEDIATELY AFTER
PRESIDENT CERTIFIES THAT TURKISH EMBARGO IS OF NO
FURTHER FORCE AND EFFECT, ALTHOUGH LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
HAVE NOT YET BEEN WORKED OUT. REOPENING WOULD BE FOR
ONE YEAR PERIOD; NEGOTIATIONS ON A NEW DEFENSE AGREEMENT
WOULD COMMENCE IMMEDIATELY. ELEKDAG NOTED THAT IN ORDER
TO MAKE THIS DECISION POLITICALLY EASIER FOR PM, IT
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WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE IF USG PROVIDED INFORMATION ON
PROBABLE FY 1980 ASSISTANCE REQUESTS FOR TURKEY AND ON
POSSIBLE RENEWED XMB LENDING ACTIVITY. NIMETZ GAVE SOME
PRELIMINARY REACTIONS BUT STRESSED THAT CONSIDERED
RESPONSE WILL REQUIRE CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON. SINCE
BASE QUESTION AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS NOT YET DISCUSSED
WITHIN TURKISH CABINET GOT VERY SENSITIVE ABOUT THIS

FOLLOW UP MEETING.

3. NIMETZ AND ELEKDAG ALSO DISCUSSED CYPRUS, TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS, AND PRISONER TRANSFER TREATY NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY.

4. ELEKDAG OPENED HIS PRESENTATION BY SAYING THAT WHILE HIS AUGUST TALKS IN WASHINGTON HAD BEEN USEFUL THE SITUATION WHICH HAD EMERGED HAD NOT BEEN VERY CLEAR. ELEKDAG THUS HAD SUGGESTED THIS MEETING IN MUNICH TO CLARIFY MATTERS AND DISCUSS NEXT STEPS. HE TOLD NIMETZ THAT AFTER RETURNING TO ANKARA PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT HAD CONVENED A HIGH LEVEL MEETING WHICH INCLUDED THE FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS' THE CHIEF OF STAFF, AND OTHERS AT WHICH ELEKDAG SAID HE HAD GIVEN A THOROUGH DEBRIEFING, PARTICULARLY STRESSING THE "PSYCHO-OPERATIONAL" STATE OF MIND OF US OFFICIALS. HE HAD EXPLAINED TO ECEVIT AND THE OTHERS THE EXEMPLARY STATESMANSHIP AND PERSONAL EFFORTS OF PRESIDENT CARTER IN THE CONGRESSIONAL EMBARGO DEBATE, THE ARGUMENTS WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION HAD USED EFFECTIVELY WITH THE CONGRESS, AND THE RESULTING US EXPECTATIONS. IN SHORT, ELEKDAG SAID HE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT WHEN THE PRESIDENT MADE THE REQUIRED DETERMINATION AND CERTIFICATION TO GIVE SECTION 620(X) NO FURTHER FORCE AND EFFECT SOMETHING IN HAND WAS NEEDED TO SHOW TO CONGRESS THAT THE EFFORT HAD BEEN WORTHWHILE. TURKISH
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LEGAL DIFFICULTIES ASIDE IF THE GOT COULD ANNOUNCE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE INSTALLATIONS WOULD FORTHWITH BE REOPENED FOR OPERATION THIS WOULD STRENGTHEN THE PRESIDENT'S HAND WITH CONGRESS AND ALSO ENABLE THE ADMINISTRATION TO TAKE THAT DEVELOPMENT INTO ACCOUNT IN PREPARING ITS FY 1980 MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROPOSALS FOR CONGRESS. ELEKDAG ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT NEGOTIATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT COULD TAKE FOUR TO SIX MONTHS, CH MADE A FASTER SOLUTION EVEN MORE DESIRABLE.

5. ELEKDAG SAID THAT AT THE MEETING TWO ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES WERE DISCUSSED TO MEET THE LEGAL PROBLEM (WHICH HE SAID PARTICULARLY CONCERNED OKCUN AND SOME OTHER MINISTERS): A) AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES BASED (ON TURKISH SIDE) ON PROVISION 6 OF LAW 244 WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE INSTALLATIONS TO REOPEN FOR UP TO ONE YEAR DURING WHICH PERIOD A NEW AGREEMENT COULD BE NEGOTIATED AND PUT INTO EFFECT. THE NOTE WOULD REFER TO SOME OF

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----080830 111811Z /42

O P 111743Z SEP 78
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9883
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
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THE 1976 DCA PRINCIPLES BUT NOT TO THAT DOCUMENT.
ELEKDAG SAID THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF SUCH A ONE YEAR
PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT COULD BE OCTOBER 1 ASSUMING A
PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION NOT LATER THAN SEPTEMBER 15.
B) ALTERNATIVELY, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT COULD ALLOW
REOPENING FOR OPERATION ON THE BASIS OF A UNILATERAL
GOVERNMENT DECISION, ALSO UNDER LAW 244, WHICH IN TURN
WOULD BE CONVEYED BY NOTE TO THE US; OUR ACCEPTANCE OF
THE TURKISH NOTE WOULD CONSTITUTE AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT.
IN THIS CASE, THE TERMS FOR THE REACTIVATION WOULD ALSO
BE ONE YEAR WHILE A NEW AGREEMENT WAS NEGOTIATED.

6. ELEKDAG SAID THAT WHILE THE TWO ALTERNATIVE LEGAL
APPROACHES WERE STILL BEING DISCUSSED THE APPROACH
DESCRIBED ABOVE (EARLY REOPENING) HAD GENERALLY BEEN
ESPOUSED. THERE WAS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO SEEK A
FINAL CABINET DECISION AFTER THE US REACTION WAS KNOWN.
HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IN ADDITION TO THE LEGAL ASPECT
THERE WAS A SECOND MAJOR PROBLEM, NAMELY LIKELY
OPPOSITION CRITICISM THAT THE ECEVIT GOVERNMENT WAS
SETTLING FOR LESS ASSISTANCE THAN PROVIDED FOR IN THE
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1976 DCA.

7. IN THIS CONNECTION, ELEKDAG RECALLED AN EXPORT-IMPORT BANK (XMB) LETTER GIVEN WHEN THE 1976 DCA WAS SIGNED INDICATING A POSSIBLE ANNUAL LOAN LEVEL OF \$70MILLION. IF XMB COULD RECOMMENCE LENDING AND IF THE GOT HAD SOME INFORMATION ABOUT ANTICIPATED LEVELS THIS WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL. IN ADDITION, ELEKDAG ASKED FOR SOME INDICATION RE THE 1980 MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE BUDGET REQUEST FOR TURKEY WHICH HE SAID SHOULD BE "ADEQUATE." BOTH THE INFORMATION RE XMB AND 1980 WOULD STRENGTHEN THE PRIME MINISTER'S HAND IN FORMALIZING THIS DECISION.

8. ELEKDAG SAID TURKEY'S PRESSING PROBLEMS WITH THE IMF SEEM SETTLED. AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON RESTRUCTURING DEBT HAD ALSO BEEN REACHED WITH THE SEVEN LEADING PRIVATE BANKS ON SEPTEMBER 4; THIS SHOULD BE CONSUMATED IN COMING WEEKS. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THE USG MIGHT INDICATE TO THE BANKS THE DESIRABILITY OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS BEING WRAPPED UP IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME AND THAT NEW CREDITS ON THE ORDER OF \$500MILLION BE ARRANGED BY MID OCTOBER. FINALLY, ELEKDAG SAID THE GOT WOULD INITIATE NEW ECONOMIC MEASURES IN THE COMING DAYS.

9. FOLLOWING A BREAK TO CONSULT WITH HIS COLLEAGUES, COUNSELOR NIMETZ RESPONDED ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES. ELEKDAG'S PRESENTATION ON RETURNING TO ANKARA HAD REFLECTED OUR THINKING AND OUR DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON. WE APPRECIATED THE CREATIVE THINKING WHICH ECEVIT, OKCUN, AND ELEKDAG AND OTHERS HAD GIVEN TO THE MATTER. NIMETZ SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO REPORT TO WASHINGTON BEFORE GIVING A FULL RESPONSE, BUT HE COULD GIVE SOME GENERAL PRELIMINARY REACTIONS.

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10. THE IDEA OF REOPENING OPERATIONS AT THE INSTALLATIONS UNDER A TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENT FOR ONE YEAR WHILE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEEDED APPEARED SATISFACTORY. HE THOUGHT IT WAS UP TO THE GOT WHICH LEGAL APPROACH (PARA 5 A OR B ABOVE) WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE. OUR INTEREST WAS IN THE MODALITIES AND THE CONTENT; WE WOULD LIKE OUR PEOPLE IN ANKARA TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE MFA ON THIS. ELEKDAG AND ERLP READILY AGREED.

11. WITH REGARD TO TIMING, NIMETZ SAID HE COULD NOT BE SURE WHEN THE PENDING EMBARGO-RELATED LEGISLATION WOULD BE ENACTED AND THUS WHEN THE CERTIFICATION WOULD BE SIGNED. A DELAY TO AROUND THE END OF SEPTEMBER SEEMED LIKELY. REOPENING OF THE INSTALLATIONS ON OCTOBER 1 WAS

NOT CRITICALLY IMPORTANT; AN EFFECTIVE DATE IN THE OCTOBER 15-30 PERIOD WOULD SEEM SATISFACTORY. NIMETZ SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THAT THE TURKISH ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE INSTALLATION QUICKLY FOLLOW THE CERTIFICATION. ACTUAL ACTIVATION WOULD TAKE SOME WEEKS IN ANY EVENT. TO AVOID APPEARANCE OF DEAD LINES IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT NEGOTIATIONS COMMENCE PROMPTLY AND THAT A DATE FOR DOING SO BE ANNOUNCED AT THE SAME TIME THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE ABOUT THE FACILITIES BEING REOPENED. ELEKDAG AGREED THIS COULD BE DONE.

12. NIMETZ SAID WE WERE PLEASED TO HEAR THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE WITH THE IMF AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THIS RELATIONSHIP WOULD BE WATCHED CAREFULLY AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION BE KEPT OPEN. NIMETZ SAID WE HAD NO WAY OF INFLUENCING THE PRIVATE BANKS BUT HE WOULD INFORM WASHINGTON OF ELEKDAG'S POSITIVE ASSESSMENT. NIMETZ

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----080868 111812Z /42

O P 111743Z SEP 78
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9884
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
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THOUGHT THAT LIFTING THE EMBARGO WOULD HAVE A HELPFUL EFFECT BY RESTORING MORE CONFIDENCE IN TURKEY AND ITS OVERALL POSITION IN THE WEST ON THE PART OF THE BANKING COMMUNITY.

13. WITH REGARD TO XMB, NIMETZ SAID WE WOULD REVIEW THE SITUATION WITH THE BANK CONCERNING THE RESUMPTION OF LENDING IN TURKEY FOR WORTHWHILE PROJECTS. WE WOULD BE

BACK IN TOUCH ON THIS.

14. NIMETZ SAID WORK ON PREPARING THE 1980 BUDGET WAS AT AN EARLY STAGE AND MANY OFFICES WERE INVOLVED. AT THE NIMETZ LEVEL THE CURRENT THINKING FOR TURKEY WAS FOR A TOTAL MILITARY/ECONOMIC PACKAGE ABOVE THE 1976 DCA LEVEL (\$250 MILLION). NIMETZ SAID WE RECOGNIZED ECEVIT'S NEED TO SHOW THAT TURKEY WOULD BE RECEIVING SIGNIFICANT PRACTICAL ASSISTANCE TO HELP COPE WITH ITS MILITARY AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. WE ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT BEFORE A FINAL PUBLIC DECISION IS TAKEN, ECEVIT NEEDS SOME GENERAL IDEA OF WHAT TO EXPECT. NIMETZ SAID THAT ON HIS RETURN TO WASHINGTON HE WOULD SEE IF THE GOT COULD AT
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LEAST BE GIVEN A REASONABLE RANGE OF LIKELY FY 1980 ASSISTANCE LEVELS AND AN INDICATION OF XMB INTENTIONS. ELEKDAG REPEATED THAT ECEVIT NEEDED SOME IDEA IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN HIS HAND POLITICALLY; THERE WAS NO INTENT TO DIVULGE THIS INFORMATION NOR WAS THIS REQUEST MEANT AS A RIGID CONDITION. ELEKDAG STRESSED THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG, STABLE, PROSPEROUS, DEMOCRATIC TURKEY WAS IMPORTANT IN THE AREA. OVERCOMING ITS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WAS CRUCIAL TO ENABLE TURKEY TO DEAL WITH OTHER PROBLEMS.

15. NIMETZ ADDED THAT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF THE PRE-EMBARGO MAP PIPELINE ITEMS WOULD BE SHIPPED TO TURKEY BY AIR BEGINNING AS SOON AS THE CERTIFICATION IS MADE. ELEKDAG EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE EQUIPMENT ITEMS SPECIFIED ON THE 1976 DCA LISTS COULD BE SOLD AT REALLY NOMINAL PRICES IN ORDER TO GET MAXIMUM VALUE FOR THE 1979 \$175MILLION CREDITS. NIMETZ SUGGESTED THAT SUCH QUESTIONS, INCLUDING PRIORITIES, COULD BEST BE WORKED OUT ON A MILITARY-TO-MILITARY BASIS SOON AFTER THE EMBARGO WAS EFFECTIVELY LIFTED.

16. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THIS PART OF THE DISCUSSION, NIMETZ SAID HE FELT WE HAD TAKEN A MAJOR STEP FORWARD, AND THAT WE WOULD KEEP THE GOT FULLY INFORMED AS TO WHEN AND IN WHAT FORM THE CERTIFICATION WOULD BE HANDLED. ON THE OTHER MATTERS DISCUSSED, WE WOULD BE IN TOUCH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THRU AMBASSADOR SPIERS AND DCM DILLON.

17. CYPRUS: NIMETZ THEN OFFERED TO BRIEF ELEKDAY ON HIS JUST COMPLETED CYPRUS VISIT. ELEKDAG READILY ACCEPTED. NIMETZ EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD TAKEN NO AMERICAN PLAN TO CYPRUS AND HAD ACTED WITH GREAT CAUTION TO INDUCE
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BOTH SIDES TO ELABORATE UPON THEIR ATTITUDES AND TO SPECULATE ABOUT ALTERNATE POSSIBILITIES. HE SOUGHT TO ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY AND THEREFORE DID NOT WANT TO SEEM AS PRESSURING EITHER SIDE.

18. NIMETZ HAD BEEN PLEASED TO NOTE THAT BOTH SIDES SEEMED TO BE LOOKING FOR PATHWAYS TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. DENHTASH HAD BEEN RELAXED AND MODERATE. HE HAD CLEARLY INDICATED DESIRE TO NEGOTIATE AND HE RENOUNCED ANY PARTITIONIST DESIRES. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, ON THEIR PART, PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY ACCEPTED THE VALIDITY OF THE MAHARIOS-DENHTASH GUIDELINES. THEY MORE CLEARLY THAN IN THE PAST RECOGNIZED THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAD LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS WHICH MUST BE DISCUSSED AND MET THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ALSO STRESSED, QUITE VOLUNTARILY, THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD ADDRESS COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC VENTURES SO THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD PERCEIVE AN ECONOMIC INCENTIVE FOR COOPERATING WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS AND SO THAT THE GROWING ECONOMIC GAP BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES MIGHT BE NARROWED. (NIMETZ ADDED THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS SHARED THIS CONCERN AND THAT SOME OF DENHTASH'S BRIGHT YOUNG COLLEAGUES HAD SEEMED INTERESTED IN THE POSSIBILITY OF ENGAGING IN ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GREEK SIDE).

19. NIMETZ MENTIONED THAT HE HAD BEEN FAVORABLY IMPRESSED WITH THE MODERATION AND PRACTICAL PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACHES OF TWO INCREASINGLY MORE IMPORTANT FIGURES ON THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE, ROLANDIS AND MICHAELIDES. THEY SEEMED GENERALLY DESIROUS OF WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION AND WERE AN IMPORTANT FORCE WITHIN

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----080892 111814Z /42

O P 111743Z SEP 78
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9885
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
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GOC DELIBERATIONS. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS STRESSED THE POSSIBILITY THAT ENOSIS WAS DEAD. NIMETZ CONCLUDED THAT ULTIMATE GREEK CYPRIOT QUESTION WAS WHETHER TURKISH PROPOSALS OF APRIL, WHICH THEY TERMED PARTITIONIST, SIGNALLED A DESIRE BY TURKEY TO DIVIDE OR CONQUER ISLAND OR WHETHER THEY WERE BASED UPON DESIRE TO PROTECT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY. IF IT WAS THE LATTER THEN THEY SAID MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS WERE ULTIMATELY POSSIBLE.

20. ELEKDAG ASKED WHETHER THE CYPRIOTS STILL INSISTED ON A MEETING WITH ECEVIT BEFORE RESUMING INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS. NIMETZ REPLIED THAT THIS HAD BEEN AN ALTERNATIVE POSED BY GREEK CYPRIOTS AMONG OTHERS FOR MOVING FORWARD. UPON HEARING THAT THEY STILL DESIRED SUCH A MEETING HE RECALLED UNSUCCESSFUL US EFFORTS TO ARRANGE SOME TYPE OF MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY MEETING ON FRINGES OF THE SSOD IN NEW YORK LAST JUNE. HE ALSO QUESTIONED WHETHER THE MODERATION OF ROLANDIS REFLECTED THE TRUE THINKING OF KYPRIANOU. ELEKDAG DOUBTED IT DID SINCE OTHERWISE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD HAVE FOUND A WAY TO SIT DOWN AND
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NEGOTIATE RATHER THAN RAISE IDEAS LIKE THAT OF THE ECEVIT/KYPRIANOU MEETING THAT WERE NEITHER SERIOUS NOR HELPFUL.

21. ELEKDAG BELIEVES KYPRIANOU WANTS TO DESTROY DENHTASH AS A POLITICAL FORCE. HE SAID THIS WOULD BE TRAGIC SINCE DENHTASH AND ECEVIT HAVE DEVELOPED A SENSE OF CONFIDENCE AND TRUST WHICH WILL LET THEM SHARE THE POLITICAL COSTS WHICH MUST RESULT FROM FLEXIBLE NEGOTIATIONS. HE STATED THAT IN THE PAST HE AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND EVEN THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN FORCED TO PRESSURE DENHTASH TO MEET WITH AMERICAN VISITORS, ETC., AND ACT WITH MODERATION BUT THAT THIS WAS NO LONGER NECESSARY.

22. ELEKDAG ALSO CITED THE CYPRIOT REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE VAROSHA OFFER AS EVIDENCE OF THEIR PRESENT

DISINTEREST IN A SOLUTION. HE SAID FACT THAT TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD HAVE AT BEST ONE THIRD VOICE IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MEANT THAT THE RETURNEES COULD NOT BE MADE HOSTAGES OR EXPELLED. MOREOVER THE INTERIM NATURE CLEARLY IMPLIED VAROSHA WOULD ULTIMATELY BE GREEK. THE ULTIMATE AREA COVERED COULD BE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION. MOREOVER VAROSHA UNDER INTERIM UN SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION SHOULD NOT BE SEEN BY GREEK CYPRIOTS OR BY WORLD IN GENERAL AS ITS FINAL STATUS, BUT SHOULD BE VIEWED AS A VERY POSITIVE GESTURE WORTHY OF SERVING AS SPRING BOARD TO FULL FLEDGED NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MAIN ISSUES OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. NIMETZ EXPRESSED HOPE THAT IT MIGHT STILL BE POSSIBLE FOR A SATISFACTORY COMPROMISE ON VAROSHA TO BE VIEWED AS ONE WAY TO MOVE FORWARD.

23. NIMETZ MENTIONED THAT ANOTHER MEANS FOR ENCOURAGING CONFIDENTIAL

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RESUMED TALKS WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH HIM ON CYPRUS INVOLVED INCREASED EFFORT BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO ESTABLISH AGREED BASIS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE INTER-COMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS. THIS COULD BE DONE PERHAPS BY BUILDING UPON MAKARIOS-DENHTASH GUIDELINES. ELEKDAG CAUTIONED AGAINST TOO VISIBLE OR ACTIVE US INVOLVEMENT IN SUH AN EFFORT AND RESTATED BELIEF THAT GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN REAL NEGOTIATIONS. NIMETZ REPLIED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO PREPARE GUIDELINES THAT NEITHER SIDE COULD REJECT FOR FEAR OF BEINGBRANDED AS INTRANSIGENT OR OBSTRUCTIONIST.

24. AFTE A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF CYPRIOT DESIRE TO CONTINUE EFFORTS IN INTERNATIONAL ARENA CONTEMPORANEOUSLY WITH ENGAGING IN QUIET SEARCH FOR PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS, ELEKDAG RESTATED HIS VIEW EXPRESSED IN WASHINGTON IN AUGUST THAT THE UNGA SHOULD RUN ITS COURSE, THE TURKISH SIDE WOULD CONTINUE, NONETHELESS TO REITERATE A DESIRE FOR NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER UNGA HE FELT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD ONLY AGREE TO NEGOTIATE IF THERE WERE PERCEIVEE INCENTIVES FOR POSITIVE GREEK CYPRIOT BEHAVIOR AND DISINCENTIVES FOR THEIR INTRANSIGENCE. HE ESPECIALLV ASKED IF USG COULD FIND WAYS TO CHANNEL AID DIRECTLY TO TURKISH CYPRIOTS RATHER THAN THRU GOC. ELEKDAG CALLED FORE MORE DIRECT GREEK INVOLVEMENT AND SAID THAT UNTIL GREEKS SEE KARAMANLIS PLAYING CLEARER ROLE THEY CANNOT TAKE SERIOUSLY INDICATIONS OF ALIENATION BETWEEN ATHENS AND NICOSIA. NIMETZ CITED AS INDICATION THAT GREEKS WERE NOT BEING UNHELPFUL FACT THAT CYPRIOTS HAVE REDUCED EMPHASIS ON SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AND REAFFIRMED

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----080920 111819Z /44

O P 111743Z SEP 78
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9886
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
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MAHARIOS-DENHTASH GUIDELINES AFTER RECENT KYPRIANOU-
KARAMANLIS MEETINGS IN GREECE.

25. GREEK-TURKISH BILATERAL RELATIONS: ELEKDAG
EXPRESSED FEAR THAT KISSINGER-BITSIOS TYPE LANGUAGE IN
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE SECURITY ASSISTANCE BILL WOULD
ENDANGER GREEK-TURKISH DIALOGUE. HE SAID GREEKS MAY
INTERPRET THE LANGUAGE AS USG SUPPORT FOR THEIR PRESENT
AEGEAN POLICY ALTHOUGH ELEKDAG SAID HE KNEW THIS WAS NOT
OUR INTENTION. HE SAID HE HAD NOTICED NEW SENSE OF
RIGIDITY IN GREEK POSITIONS IN THE AIR SPACE TALKS AFTER
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE LANGUAGE MADE PUBLIC. HE ASKED THAT
US SEEK WAYS TO EXPRESS EVEN HANDEDNESS IN AEGEAN AND
AVOID MISLEADING GREEKS AND GIVING THEM UNDUE HOPE THAT
THEY CAN SIT TIGHT AND GET THEIR WAY. ELEKDAG SAID HE
AND THEODOROPOLOUS HAVE A GOOD RELATIONSHIP BUT THEY CAN
ONLY PREPARE WAY FOR A FURTHER ECEVIT/KARAMANLIS MEETING
IF GREEKS BACK OFF UNTENABLE POSITIONS LIKE TEN MILE
AIR SPACE AROUND ISLANDS WHICH HAVE SIX MILE TERRITORIAL
SEAS. HE CONCLUDED THAT HE WOULD BE TAKING FRESH
PROPOSALS TO NEXT MEETING IN ATHENS WITH THEODOROPOLOUS.
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26. NIMETZ REAFFIRMED US DESIRE TO STAY OUT OF BILATERAL GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTES WHILE ENCOURAGING NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. HE READ CAREFULLY TO ELEKDAG THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE LANGUAGE WHICH AT OUR BEHEST ADDED A REFERENCE TO NEGOTIATIONS.

27. NIMETZ URGED GOT TO ADDRESS GREEK REENTRY IN NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE IN FLEXIBLE MANNER SO THAT THE ON-GOING DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE NATO STRUCTURE HELP AND NOT HARM GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS. NIMETZ ASKED TURKEY TO VIEW GREEK RETURN TO NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE AND THE CONTRIBUTION THIS COULD MAKE TO STRENGTHENING GREEK DEMOCRACY AND VITALITY IN THE SAME WAY THAT TURKEY ASKED THE US AND THE ALLIES TO VIEW THE ELIMINATION OF THE EMBARGO AND THE STRENGTHENING OF TURKEY'S DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMY.

28. ELEKDAG REAFFIRMED TURKEY'S DESIRE THAT GREECE RETURN TO NATO AS AN EFFECTIVE AND TRUSTED ALLY AND FULL PARTNER. HE CAUTIONED THAT THE GREEKS WERE VERY CLEVER AND THAT TURKS FEARED THEY WERE SEEKING TURKISH CONSENT TO RE-INTEGRATION TERMS THAT WOULD ENDORSE GREEK POSITIONS ON BROADER AEGEAN DISPUTE AND WOULD NOT BE PRACTICAL. FOR EXAMPLE GREECE WANTED NATO TO ACCEPT A GREEK COMMAND FOR THE ENTIRE AEGEAN (MINUS NARROW TURKISH TERRITORIAL SEA.) FOR TURKEY THIS WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE NOR COULD TURKEY AGREE THAT THIS WAS SIMPLY MODIFIED CONTINUATION OF PRE 1974 SITUATION. BEFORE 1974 ENTIRE AEGEAN AREA WAS EFFECTIVELY UNDER COMMAND OF AMERICAN WITH BROAD RESPONSIBILITIES AND WITH MEANS FOR ASSURING THAT PROCEDURES WORKED. THIS HAD BEEN A GENERALLY EFFECTIVE AND ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENT. PROCEDURE
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NOW ENVISAGED WAS NEITHER. NONETHELESS ELEKDAG SAID GOT WOULD KEEP OPEN MIND IN NATO DISCUSSIONS AND IN TALKS WITH GREEK GOVERNMENT.

29. PRISONER TRANSFER TREATY: AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING, NIMETZ NOTED THAT RECENT PRISONER TRANSFER TREATY NEGOTIATIONS HAD APPARENTLY ENCOUNTERED PROBLEM WITH US PAROLE BOARD AND ITS FUNCTIONS. WE HOPED THIS MATTER COULD BE SOLVED AND THE TREATY CONCLUDED. ELEKDAG ACKNOWLEDGED THERE WAS A LEGAL/TECHNICAL PROBLEM BUT NOT A POLITICAL ONE; HE SAID WE HAVE TO FIND A WAY TO OVER-COME THIS PROBLEM.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETINGS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, MILITARY AGREEMENTS, MILITARY BASES, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, EMBARGOES, C AT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 11 sep 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978LONDON14618
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P840139-2264
Format: TEL
From: LONDON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780982/aaaacptv.tel
Line Count: 601
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: d15f7053-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS, EXDIS
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS, EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 31 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1486700
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: US-TURKEY DISCUSSIONS, MUNICH, SEPT. 8
TAGS: PEPR, MASS, MARR, TU, US, CY, (NIMETZ, MATTHEW), (HOOPER, ROBERT), (ELEKDAG, SUKRO)
To: STATE ANKARA MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvgwkey: odbcc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/d15f7053-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014